Physical & Self-Defense · Grappling

Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu

What the Gracies added to the judo Maeda carried into Belém was a set of terms under which its ground half could not lose.

Studio photograph of a compact Japanese man in his early thirties, standing three-quarters to the camera in a long heavy overcoat over a waistcoat and high white collar, one hand resting on a walking stick, hair swept back, a small moustache, against a plain pale backdrop.
Maeda Mitsuyo around 1910, in the middle of the touring years, photographed as a gentleman of the world rather than a fighter. He left Japan in 1904 as a Kodokan judoka and never lived there again. Source: Wikimedia Commons, where the author and licence terms for this file are recorded.

A seventeen-year-old from Aomori walked into the Kodokan in 1895, five foot four and a hundred and forty-one pounds, and was taken for a delivery boy. Kano Jigoro put him under Tomita Tsunejiro, the smallest of the four senior teachers the school called its Heavenly Kings, so that a small man would be the one to show him that size settles nothing. His name was Maeda Mitsuyo. The art now sold everywhere as a Brazilian invention is what he was carrying when he came ashore at Porto Alegre on 14 November 1914.

He had spent the decade before that earning his passage in theatres and wrestling halls across New York, Havana, Mexico City and Barcelona, where a promoter billing himself as the Japanese champion so irritated him that he took a challenge-name to go and collect the man, and kept it: Conde Koma. His first Belém demonstration came at the Theatro Politheama on 20 December 1915, and in 1917 a fourteen-year-old called Carlos Gracie watched him work at the Da Paz Theatre and asked to be taught. What he taught was judo, which the Belém papers called jiu-jitsu because in 1915 nobody had separated the two words. With it came a theory he had assembled on the road, that a fight passes through phases, free movement and then the clinch and then the floor, and that the winner is the man who holds it in the phase he owns.

He had already watched what happens when somebody else picks the phase. Ten years earlier, Tomita and Maeda gave a demonstration at West Point, and the cadets asked for a turn.

ReadThe New York Times, 21 February 1905 · tap the dotted words for a gloss

The wrestled with his assistant, throwing him around like a rubber ball. He then called for cadet volunteers. Cadet Tipton, the All-American football , went on the mat and football methods soon had beaten. The big fellow pinned the wiry [Japanese] flat on his back three times without being thrown in the bout. Cadet Daly also threw the professor.

“Cadets Down the ‘Jap.’: Exponent of Jiu-Jitsu Thrown by West Point Athletes,” The New York Times, 21 February 1905, page 5. The headline and the report both used a racial epithet, which is replaced in brackets here.

Maeda had thrown his own cadet without trouble, and the paper reported the evening by its worst moment. The sneering covers a technical fact. West Point was judging by wrestling’s criteria, where a match ends at a pin, and a pin is a standing man’s verdict on the floor. A grappler whose whole case rests on making the other man give up has no way to score at all.

In Rio the Gracies removed that problem. A challenge match at their academy could be won only by submission, a tap or a strangle carried to unconsciousness, and a throw scored nothing whatever. Japanese judoka in Brazil went in one after another and kept losing to a man they could put on the floor at will. In 1951 Kato Yukio, twenty-two years old and a Chiba champion, threw Hélio Gracie repeatedly through a full match and was given a draw. In the rematch Hélio choked him unconscious, and a Rio paper ran the photograph.

THE LADDER Positions on the floor are ranked, and you climb before you finish. Under mount or side control Pinned, no frames, both arms committed to surviving. The bottom of the ladder. Guard Underneath, legs between you and him. The Gracie contribution: being on the bottom is even. Side control Chest across his chest, past the legs. His hips can still turn. Knee on belly Mobile and heavy at once. A transit position, not a resting one. Mount Sitting on his chest. He can see you, which is the one thing left in his favour. Back control Behind him, heels hooked inside his thighs. CLIMB even: the rung the art invented Everything below this line is losing. Everything above it is winning, and the higher rung wins harder.
The positional hierarchy, drawn for this lesson. A judo contest ends when someone lands on his back, so the whole ladder sits inside the losing condition. Score only the tap and the ladder becomes the game.

Japan had gone the other way, and a change in the contest rules is what sent it there. Students in the school championships had worked out that a weaker man could survive indefinitely on the floor, so the Kodokan tightened its rules in 1925 to restrict how a fighter could take the match down, and Kano is quoted the following year worrying that the ground men were becoming contest winners who could no longer defend themselves. Judo went back to throwing. Belém and Rio kept what Maeda had brought.

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So the Japanese community in Brazil sent for a man who had both. Kimura Masahiko had gone fifteen years in Japanese competition without a defeat, and at a hundred and eighty-seven pounds he could hold as well as he could throw. On 23 October 1951 the Maracanã filled, the vice-president came, and armed police were posted around the ground against the riot everyone expected. Kimura opened with o-soto-gari and meant to finish it on the spot. The mat was too soft to knock a man out on. The fight went to the floor, which is where Hélio wanted it, and Kimura beat him there in the second round with gyaku ude-garami, a shoulder lock. Hélio would not tap. The arm broke, Kimura kept turning it, and Carlos threw in the towel. The Gracie academies named the lock after the man who had used it on them, and every gym on earth calls it a kimura.

Sepia archival photograph, creased from folding, of a lean moustached man in his late thirties kneeling on a mat in a white gi with a dark belt, hands resting on his thighs, looking past the camera. Another figure in a gi stands out of focus behind him.
Hélio Gracie in 1952, the year after the Maracanã. He fought at about a hundred and thirty-nine pounds against Kimura’s hundred and eighty-seven, and afterwards called the defeat the only one of his career and a source of pride. Source: Wikimedia Commons (Arquivo Nacional), where the author and licence terms for this file are recorded.

Rorion, Hélio’s eldest, moved the whole argument to California and in 1993 built it a stage. With the advertising man Art Davie he sold a pay-per-view tournament on terms his father would have recognised: eight men, one night, no rounds, no judges, no weight classes, no way to win except to finish. He entered the smallest of the brothers. “I was the right size,” Royce Gracie said later. “I wasn’t bulked up and big and I didn’t look very scary, so to speak.” At McNichols Arena in Denver on 12 November 1993 he submitted a professional boxer, a shootfighter and a savate champion, and spent four minutes and fifty-nine seconds inside the cage across the whole tournament.

The same campaign put a number into the world. Rorion had been saying since the late 1980s that ninety per cent of fights go to the ground, and the study he was gesturing at is real and says something narrower. Sergeant Greg Dossey, an exercise physiologist with the Los Angeles Police Department, read all 5,617 use-of-force narratives the force filed in 1988 and found 2,031 with enough resistance in them to count as altercations. Five recurring patterns covered ninety-five per cent of those, and sixty-two per cent ended with officer and suspect on the ground, the officer applying a joint lock and putting the cuffs on. That measures how arrests finish, and an officer takes a resisting man down on purpose. A 2003 survey of some fourteen hundred officers gives the civilian shape: fifty-two per cent had had somebody try to take them down, and the attempt worked six times in ten.

What Maeda handed over was a way of choosing where to have the fight, and the Gracies built on top of it the ranking that tells you at any second whether you are winning. Everyone trains the floor now, from Olympic wrestlers to the Army’s combatives syllabus, so the Denver result cannot be had again. What beat Royce’s opponents was information they did not have yet. Maeda never learned how any of it turned out. The Kodokan promoted him to seventh dan on 27 November 1941, and he died in Belém the next day.