The Cuban Missile Crisis
Thirteen days in October 1962 when a set of aerial photographs brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the edge of nuclear war, and the men on both sides chose, barely, to step back.

On the morning of the sixteenth of October 1962, President Kennedy was handed a set of grainy photographs taken from eleven miles above the Cuban countryside. They showed launch pads, cabling, and canvas-covered trailers in a field near San Cristóbal, and the analysts who read them were certain of what they meant: the Soviet Union was building sites for medium-range nuclear missiles ninety miles from Florida. For the next thirteen days the world lived closer to nuclear war than it ever had before, or has since.
The film came from a U-2 spy plane flown by Major Richard Heyser two days earlier, on one of the high-altitude passes the Air Force had been making over the island since Soviet ships began unloading crates that summer. The weapons were R-12 rockets, which NATO called the SS-4, capable of carrying a one-megaton warhead more than a thousand miles. From Cuba that arc reached Washington and most of the country, with a flight time of a few minutes and almost no warning. A nation that had always felt oceans between itself and any serious threat now had nuclear missiles being assembled in its own front yard.


Kennedy told almost no one at first. He pulled together a small circle of advisers, later formalized as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, the ExComm, and set them to argue the options in secret while he kept up his public schedule so Moscow would not learn what he knew. The military chiefs wanted an air strike on the sites, followed by an invasion. Kennedy, burned by the Bay of Pigs the year before and reading that week how the miscalculations of August 1914 had pulled Europe into a war nobody had chosen, leaned toward something slower. He settled on a naval blockade of the island and called it a “quarantine,” since a blockade in international law is an act of war and the softer word left him room to maneuver.

On the evening of the twenty-second, after a week of secrecy, Kennedy went on television to tell the country and the world what the cameras had found. He announced the quarantine, demanded that the missiles be withdrawn, and drew a line that left no doubt about what a launch would mean.
“It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”
President John F. Kennedy, radio and television address to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962.
For two days the world watched the quarantine line. Soviet ships steamed toward it, and on the twenty-fourth the nearest of them slowed and turned back, prompting Secretary of State Dean Rusk to murmur to a colleague, “We’re eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.” The confrontation was not over. The twenty-seventh, remembered ever after as Black Saturday, was the most dangerous day of all. A Soviet surface-to-air missile shot down a U-2 over Cuba and killed its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, the only man to die by enemy fire in the whole crisis. A second U-2 strayed by navigational accident into Soviet airspace over Siberia. And in the Caribbean, American destroyers dropped signaling depth charges on a Soviet submarine, the B-59, whose captain, cut off from Moscow and half-convinced the war had already begun, ordered its nuclear torpedo prepared. Firing it needed the assent of three officers aboard. One of them, Vasili Arkhipov, withheld his, and the torpedo stayed in its tube.
Two letters had arrived from Nikita Khrushchev as the crisis peaked. The first, on the twenty-sixth, was personal and nearly pleading, offering to remove the missiles in return for an American promise not to invade Cuba. The second, the next day, was colder and added a fresh demand, that the United States pull its own Jupiter missiles out of Turkey. Robert Kennedy, the president’s brother and closest counsel, proposed answering the warmer letter in public and ignoring the harder one, while conceding the Turkey point in private. That night he met the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, and told him the Jupiters would be gone within a few months, provided the bargain stayed secret. On the twenty-eighth, Khrushchev announced over Moscow radio that the missiles in Cuba would be dismantled and shipped home.
Both leaders could then claim a victory. Kennedy had faced down the missiles without firing a shot; Khrushchev had a public American pledge to leave Cuba alone and a private one to clear Turkey. The concession on Turkey stayed hidden for decades, which let the affair harden into a simpler legend of American nerve. What the participants themselves took away was how nearly accident and misreading had carried them over the edge, and how much had turned on quiet back-channels and the restraint of individual men. Within a year Washington and Moscow had strung a direct teletype line between them, the “hotline,” and signed the first treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The thirteen days became the case study every leader since has read for how to stand at the brink and not go over it.