The Federal Reserve
How a duck-hunting cover story in 1910 produced the institution that sets the price of money in America, and what that power cost the one chairman who used it to the limit.

In the autumn of 1907 the Knickerbocker Trust Company failed, the runs spread from one New York house to the next, and the man who stopped them held no office. J. P. Morgan, a private banker who had helped rescue the federal government from a crisis of its own twelve years earlier, gathered the heads of the surviving institutions and assembled the private money and lines of credit that propped the system up until the fear burned itself out. The country had been saved by one financier’s judgment and the money he could summon in a week, and enough people in Washington found that intolerable that within six years the United States had a central bank.
The panic itself was ordinary. Nationwide ones had come on average every fifteen years through the nineteenth century, and they all ran on the same fault. American banks held large cash reserves, but those reserves sat scattered across thousands of separate vaults and in deposits parked in a few designated reserve cities, and in a crisis they froze exactly where they were. Currency was no more flexible, since the quantity in circulation was tied to a special class of federal bonds rather than to the demand for cash, so it would not swell for the autumn harvest or the Christmas trade, and short-term interest rates lurched from one month to the next. Europe had solved both problems with central banks. Among the world’s major financial powers the United States was the only one without.
The fix was drafted in secret. In November 1910 Nelson Aldrich, the Rhode Island senator who chaired the Finance Committee and the monetary commission created after the panic, decided to convene a small group to turn two years of study into a bill, and he knew that the men who could write it were the men whose fingerprints would kill it: Paul Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb; Henry Davison of J. P. Morgan; Frank Vanderlip of National City Bank; the assistant Treasury secretary A. Piatt Andrew; and Aldrich’s own secretary, Arthur Shelton. They came one at a time to a rail terminal in New Jersey, boarded Aldrich’s private car, and for the length of the journey used first names only, so the staff could not work out who was aboard. The cover story was a duck hunt.

The destination was the Jekyll Island Club, a winter retreat off the Georgia coast that Munsey’s Magazine in 1904 had called “the most exclusive, the most inaccessible” club in the world, and whose members included Morgan, Marshall Field and a Vanderbilt. For more than a week the six rose early and worked late on the question that divided them. All of them wanted a central bank; they disagreed about how much of it the bankers should control. What they carried home, a Reserve Association of America with fifteen branches, became the Aldrich Plan. They took to calling themselves the First Name Club, and they denied for twenty years that the meeting had happened at all. B. C. Forbes printed the story in 1916, and Aldrich’s biographer records that the few readers who noticed dismissed it as a yarn.
The Fed’s own account of the meeting, filmed on the island. Watch for how frankly a central bank now tells the story it spent two decades denying.
The plan died with the 1912 election. The Democrats ran on repudiating it, Woodrow Wilson won both the presidency and his majorities, and the bill that finally passed was written by Carter Glass in the House and Robert Owen in the Senate. Technically it was Aldrich’s machine rebuilt, with the same elastic currency, the same pooled reserves, the same lender of last resort. Politically it was inverted. Aldrich would have let the member banks elect the leadership with the largest banks weighing most; Wilson insisted on a board of presidential appointees over the whole system, and the conference committee stretched their terms to ten staggered years so that no president serving twice could name them all. Wilson signed on 23 December 1913.
“An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an , to afford means of , to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.”
Long title as enacted. Public Law 63-43, 63d Congress, H.R. 7837.
That compromise is still standing in the architecture, which is why the question of who owns the Fed has no tidy answer. The Board of Governors in Washington is an independent agency of the federal government. The twelve regional Reserve Banks are chartered like private corporations: every member bank in a district subscribes to stock worth 6 percent of its own capital and surplus, and elects six of the nine directors of its Reserve Bank. That stock cannot be sold or pledged as collateral, and it buys a capped dividend and nothing else. Everything the system earns beyond the dividend and a statutory surplus goes to the Treasury, which in 2021 meant a payment of $107.4 billion.
Policy is made by the Federal Open Market Committee: the seven governors, the president of the New York Fed permanently, and four of the eleven other Reserve Bank presidents serving one-year rotations. The Act as amended in 1977 directs them to promote “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates,” three goals that everyone including the Fed calls the dual mandate, on the reasoning that an economy where people can find work and prices hold steady will produce moderate rates on its own. Since 2012 the Committee has published what it means by steady, which is 2 percent a year measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures. Its instrument is a target range for the federal funds rate, the overnight rate banks charge each other for the reserve balances they keep at the Fed, and it moves that rate by changing what the Fed itself pays on those balances, since no bank will lend to anyone at less than it earns by sitting still.
What the mandate can cost was settled in Paul Volcker’s first three years. He took the chairmanship in August 1979 with inflation running near 9 percent and the dollar down more than a tenth against the major currencies since 1976. On the Saturday evening of 6 October, the weekend of Columbus Day, he called reporters to the Eccles Building to announce that the Committee would stop steering the daily funds rate and would constrain the volume of bank reserves instead, letting the rate go wherever that took it. It went to 20 percent, a record, in late 1980. Farmers protested outside the headquarters, and car dealers mailed in coffins packed with the keys of cars they could not sell. A Texas congressman threatened a bill to impeach Volcker and most of the Board, and by the summer of 1982 the House majority leader was calling for his resignation.

Volcker held, and unemployment reached 10.8 percent late in 1982, the deepest fall in output and jobs the country had seen since the war, before the recession bottomed out that summer. Inflation, which had peaked at 11.6 percent in March 1980, was 6.1 percent by early 1982 and 3.7 percent the year after. The long stretch of steady growth that followed is known as the Great Moderation, and economists give much of the credit to what those three years bought: the Fed had demonstrated it would accept a severe recession rather than let prices run, and everyone pricing a loan afterward believed it.
The arrangement still shows its seams. Since September 2022 the Fed has paid more interest on bank reserves than its own holdings of Treasuries earn, so the remittances to Washington stopped and the shortfall accumulates on its books as a deferred asset, $133 billion at the end of 2023, which has to be worked off before the Treasury sees another dollar. A central bank publishes a number like that because the whole fight of 1913 was about the terms on which a small group gets to set the price of money. Aldrich wanted those people accountable to the banks, Wilson wanted them accountable to the public, and what came out of the argument was an institution designed so that they can be watched closely and overruled by no one.